The future of the space program

Here's a couple of interesting articles. Good points made about the benefits of partial privatization of the space industry; and also how the resistance to an updated vehicle design can be (without much cynicism) linked to the almighty dollar.
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Securing the Future
By Glenn Harlan Reynolds
Contributing Editor, TCS
http://www.techcentralstation.com/1051/techwrapper.jsp?PID=1051-250&CID=1051-020303B

The bodies have been found, and the Columbia disaster is now out of the initial phase. NASA has done a good job getting off the mark, with Homeland Security and local law-enforcement officials activated within minutes, and an independent review commission, headed by Admiral Harold W. Gehman, Jr. (who led the Pentagon investigation into the U.S.S. Cole attack) organized and ready to hold its first meeting within 24 hours. "We didn't want to open that envelope," a senior NASA official told me when I talked to him on the phone Sunday afternoon, "but we had the contingency plan and we activated it." It seems to have gone pretty well.

He also observed that "what we're most afraid of are the people who want to help us." What he meant was that NASA has a two-stage process, and they want to keep the stages distinct. Stage one is the engineering process of figuring out what went wrong, and how to fix it. NASA wants to get that done as quickly as possible, and it's doubtful that very many outsiders have the relevant expertise to help, though there will be many people who will want to get involved for various reasons. That's what happened after the Challenger disaster, and the result was that the Shuttle fleet stayed grounded for over two years - most of which was, as another senior NASA official described it, "political time." Nobody wants that to happen again.

I think that's right, though as I've written elsewhere, I don't think that the country will respond to this tragedy the same way it responded to the Challenger explosion. As Mark Steyn wrote in London's Telegraph:

They were an American crew - four men, one black; two women, one born in India. Nonetheless, this will not be as traumatisingly mesmeric as the Challenger disaster. The yellow-ribbon era died with September 11: even if their television networks haven't quite adjusted, Americans are tougher about these things; this is a country at war and one that understands how to absorb losses and setbacks.

I think that's right. And I think that NASA will be allowed to perform its engineering inquiries without too much interference, though there will certainly be a lot of interested onlookers paying close attention.

But that's the first stage. The second stage is one in which the public should take part: the stage in which we decide what to do next. The old Shuttle system was unsustainable anyway - the plans to keep the Shuttle as a mainstay until 2020 were always unrealistic. But now they're impossible, and building a new orbiter, as we did after Challenger, is a silly idea.

The irony is that NASA was already starting to realize this. I was supposed to be in on a teleconference at which NASA would unveil the new budget on Monday morning, February 3d. That was cancelled over the weekend, of course, but the word was that NASA was going to reveal a number of interesting new initiatives designed to wean us off of the Space Shuttle and reestablish the momentum in interplanetary exploration.

Over the next weeks and months, I suppose that these plans will come out anyway. But the public debate should be on how to move ahead with an ambitious space program without committing ourselves to another big, bureaucratic program like the Space Shuttle, which never really took us where we wanted to go. Instead, we need to find ways to unleash the energies of the private sector, and to allow industries like space tourism to play a bigger role. It's capitalism that lowers costs, not government programs.

That won't put NASA out of business, but it's an argument that NASA should go back to its original role (back when it was the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics and worked on aviation) of doing research and development on technology that wound up, ultimately, being used by the private sector rather than NASA (or NACA) itself.

A twenty-first century NASA should focus on new space launch technologies (including such "breakthrough" technologies as laser launch and scramjets), on interplanetary exploration (which won't have a commercial market for a while) and on other things that the private sector can't do. Those things that the private sector can do, like launching things to low-earth orbit, should be left to the private sector.

I say that the debate will be over how to move ahead, rather than whether to move ahead, because I think that's how most Americans feel. As of Sunday afternoon, the email for my MSNBC site was running hundreds-to-one in favor of going on with an ambitious space program (and I mean literally "one" - I got only one email saying that we should just give up on space and stay home, and it was from a Canadian). As the Christian Science Monitor noted, Americans share

a hope for humans to break free of the material bounds of Earth and discover a better future in the expanse of the universe. That deep desire, like a chick pecking at its shell, goes beyond merely seeking useful spinoffs in technology, military defense, or international cooperation from the billions spent on space research. It's a hope that has served to revive public support for NASA after each disaster, starting with the 1967 Apollo fire, then the 1986 Challenger explosion, and now the loss of seven astronauts on Columbia's reentry to Earth. It's a hope that tolerates the risks of breaking new barriers but one that demands a rigorous investigation when things go wrong - not to end space research but to serve as a course correction for NASA.

I think that's right - I've even used the "cracking the shell metaphor myself. And I think that realization is what's missing from critiques like Gregg Easterbrook's article in Time entitled "The Shuttle Must Be Stopped." The Shuttle may indeed suffer from many of the problems Easterbrook identifies - in fact, I believe that it does, and those problems have been the talk of space enthusiasts for years. But what Easterbrook's critique, and his seeming enthusiasm for letting robots take over space travel entirely, miss is that space exploration is about far more than bringing back knowledge that will enrich the careers of planetary scientists. It's about paving the way for humanity's expansion into the solar system. The Shuttle may not have much of a role to play in that process. But those who criticize it need to understand that, whatever happens to the Shuttle, the process itself must go on.

America is a frontier nation, and leading humanity off this planet and into a space-faring civilization that spans the Solar System (for a start) is our manifest destiny. Americans understand that. The question isn't whether, but how. And the debate promises to be an important one.
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The Space Shuttle Must Be Stopped
By GREGG EASTERBROOK
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1101030210-418518,00.html

A spacecraft is a metaphor of national inspiration: majestic, technologically advanced, produced at dear cost and entrusted with precious cargo, rising above the constraints of the earth. The spacecraft carries our secret hope that there is something better out there—a world where we may someday go and leave the sorrows of the past behind. The spacecraft rises toward the heavens exactly as, in our finest moments as a nation, our hearts have risen toward justice and principle. And when, for no clear reason, the vessel crumbles, as it did in 1986 with Challenger and last week with Columbia, we falsely think the promise of America goes with it.

Unfortunately, the core problem that lay at the heart of the Challenger tragedy applies to the Columbia tragedy as well. That core problem is the space shuttle itself. For 20 years, the American space program has been wedded to a space-shuttle system that is too expensive, too risky, too big for most of the ways it is used, with budgets that suck up funds that could be invested in a modern system that would make space flight cheaper and safer. The space shuttle is impressive in technical terms, but in financial terms and safety terms no project has done more harm to space exploration. With hundreds of launches to date, the American and Russian manned space programs have suffered just three fatal losses in flight—and two were space-shuttle calamities. This simply must be the end of the program.

Will the much more expensive effort to build a manned International Space Station end too? In cost and justification, it's as dubious as the shuttle. The two programs are each other's mirror images. The space station was conceived mainly to give the shuttle a destination, and the shuttle has been kept flying mainly to keep the space station serviced. Three crew members—Expedition Six, in NASA argot—remain aloft on the space station. Probably a Russian rocket will need to go up to bring them home. The wisdom of replacing them seems dubious at best. This second shuttle loss means NASA must be completely restructured—if not abolished and replaced with a new agency with a new mission.

Why did NASA stick with the space shuttle so long? Though the space shuttle is viewed as futuristic, its design is three decades old. The shuttle's main engines, first tested in the late 1970s, use hundreds more moving parts than do new rocket-motor designs. The fragile heat-dissipating tiles were designed before breakthroughs in materials science. Until recently, the flight-deck computers on the space shuttle used old 8086 chips from the early 1980s, the sort of pre-Pentium electronics no self-respecting teenager would dream of using for a video game.

Most important, the space shuttle was designed under the highly unrealistic assumption that the fleet would fly to space once a week and that each shuttle would need to be big enough to carry 50,000 lbs. of payload. In actual use, the shuttle fleet has averaged five flights a year; this year flights were to be cut back to four. The maximum payload is almost never carried. Yet to accommodate the highly unrealistic initial goals, engineers made the shuttle huge and expensive. The Soviet space program also built a shuttle, called Buran, with almost exactly the same dimensions and capacities as its American counterpart. Buran flew to orbit once and was canceled, as it was ridiculously expensive and impractical.

Capitalism, of course, is supposed to weed out such inefficiencies. But in the American system, the shuttle's expense made the program politically attractive. Originally projected to cost $5 million per flight in today's dollars, each shuttle launch instead runs to around $500 million. Aerospace contractors love the fact that the shuttle launches cost so much.

In two decades of use, shuttles have experienced an array of problems—engine malfunctions, damage to the heat-shielding tiles—that have nearly produced other disasters. Seeing this, some analysts proposed that the shuttle be phased out, that cargo launches be carried aboard by far cheaper, unmanned, throwaway rockets and that NASA build a small "space plane" solely for people, to be used on those occasions when men and women are truly needed in space.

Throwaway rockets can fail too. Last month a French-built Ariane exploded on lift-off. No one cared, except the insurance companies that covered the payload, because there was no crew aboard. NASA's insistence on sending a crew on every shuttle flight means risking precious human life for mindless tasks that automated devices can easily carry out. Did Israeli astronaut Ilan Ramon really have to be there to push a couple of buttons on the Mediterranean Israeli Dust Experiment, the payload package he died to accompany to space?

Switching to unmanned rockets for payload launching and a small space plane for those rare times humans are really needed would cut costs, which is why aerospace contractors have lobbied against such reform. Boeing and Lockheed Martin split roughly half the shuttle business through an Orwellian-named consortium called the United Space Alliance. It's a source of significant profit for both companies; United Space Alliance employs 6,400 contractor personnel for shuttle launches alone. Many other aerospace contractors also benefit from the space-shuttle program.

Any new space system that reduced costs would be, to the contractors, killing the goose that lays the golden egg. Just a few weeks ago, NASA canceled a program called the Space Launch Initiative, whose goal was to design a much cheaper and more reliable replacement for the shuttle. Along with the cancellation, NASA announced that the shuttle fleet would remain in operation until 2020, meaning that Columbia was supposed to continue flying into outer space even when its airframe was more than 40 years old! True, B-52s have flown as long. But they don't endure three times the force of gravity on takeoff and 2000*none on re-entry.

A rational person might have laughed out loud at the thought that although school buses are replaced every decade, a spaceship was expected to remain in service for 40 years. Yet the "primes," as NASA's big contractors are known, were overjoyed when the Space Launch Initiative was canceled because it promised them lavish shuttle payments indefinitely. Of course, the contractors also worked hard to make the shuttle safe. But keeping prices up was a higher priority than having a sensible launch system.

Will NASA whitewash problems as it did after Challenger? The haunting fact of Challenger was that engineers who knew about the booster-joint problem begged NASA not to launch that day and were ignored. Later the Rogers Commission, ordered to get to the bottom of things, essentially recommended that nothing change. No NASA manager was fired; no safety systems were added to the solid rocket boosters whose explosion destroyed Challenger; no escape-capsule system was added to get astronauts out in a calamity, which might have helped Columbia. In return for failure, the shuttle program got a big budget increase. Post-Challenger "reforms" were left up to the very old-boy network that had created the problem in the first place and that benefited from continuing high costs.

Concerned foremost with budget politics, Congress too did its best to whitewash. Large manned-space-flight centers that depend on the shuttle are in Texas, Ohio, Florida and Alabama. Congressional delegations from these states fought frantically against a shuttle replacement. The result was years of generous funding for constituents—and now another tragedy.

The tough questions that have gone unasked about the space shuttle have also gone unasked about the space station, which generates billions in budget allocations for California, Texas, Ohio, Florida and other states. Started in 1984 and originally slated to cost $14 billion in today's dollars, the space station has already cost at least $35 billion—not counting billions more for launch costs—and won't be finished until 2008. The bottled water alone that crews use aboard the space station costs taxpayers almost half a million dollars a day. (No, that is not a misprint.) There are no scientific experiments aboard the space station that could not be done far more cheaply on unmanned probes. The only space-station research that does require crew is "life science," or studying the human body's response to space. Space life science is useful but means astronauts are on the station mainly to take one another's pulse, a pretty marginal goal for such an astronomical price.

What is next for America in space? An outsider commission is needed to investigate the Columbia accident—and must report to the President, not Congress, since Congress has shown itself unable to think about anything but pork barrel when it comes to space programs.

For 20 years, the cart has been before the horse in U.S. space policy. NASA has been attempting complex missions involving many astronauts without first developing an affordable and dependable means to orbit. The emphasis now must be on designing an all-new system that is lower priced and reliable. And if human space flight stops for a decade while that happens, so be it. Once there is a cheaper and safer way to get people and cargo into orbit, talk of grand goals might become reality. New, less-expensive throwaway rockets would allow NASA to launch more space probes—the one part of the program that is constantly cost-effective. An affordable means to orbit might make possible a return to the moon for establishment of a research base and make possible the long-dreamed-of day when men and women set foot on Mars. But no grand goal is possible while NASA relies on the super-costly, dangerous shuttle.

In 1986 the last words transmitted from Challenger were in the valiant vow: "We are go at throttle up!" This meant the crew was about to apply maximum thrust, which turned out to be a fatal act. In the coming days, we will learn what the last words from Columbia were. Perhaps they too will reflect the valor and optimism shown by astronauts of all nations. It is time NASA and the congressional committees that supervise the agency demonstrated a tiny percentage of the bravery shown by the men and women who fly to space—by canceling the money-driven shuttle program and replacing it with something that makes sense.

Gregg Easterbrook is a senior editor of the New Republic and a visiting fellow of the Brookings Institution. Five years before Challenger, he wrote in the Washington Monthly that the shuttles' solid rocket boosters were not safe.

 

I guess I could have been clearer in my opening paragraph when I said "privatization", I was referencing primarily the section above now in bold.

No Worries, thanks for the correction.

 

Here's a couple of good articles on NASA's plans for nuclear propulsion as a means of inter-planetary exploration, imo exactly the type of thing NASA should be focusing on as a prerequisite to manned Mars missions.

http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,57555,00.html

http://www.techcentralstation.com/1051/techwrapper.jsp?PID=1051-250&CID=1051-012203A

And an article on a highly theoretical "space elevator", eliminating the need to launch from earth's surface.

http://www.space.com/businesstechnology/technology/space_elevator_020327-1.html