If Lin played for a Greek pro team could he bring the country back to solvency?

The Greek Gold whatever would probably lynch Lin on arrival..

 

Yes. But only if Scola joins Lin as his sidekick. Their dominance on the court will create a wormhole so big that the time will be turned back and Greece will reverse to its golden age era. Lin will be there to save Aristotle from the mob and cure Alexander from his illness.

 

Not sure how bouncing a leather rubber ball builds up a country. Presumably, the fact that eyeballs are glued to this one person allows advertisers to harvest economies of number in communicating their product, but the Greeks would still be left to do the dirty work.

 

the short answer is no.

bankers don't want a solvent greece until further rounds of privatization are first pushed through. each greek citizen above age 13 must have also deposited at least 2.7 liters of blood into IMF reserves over the previous 36 months and donated at least one bodily organ to the World Bank.

also Golden Dawn might kill lin before he is able to resurrect the nation.

 

Fact is, basketball isn't that popular in Europe, at least not compared to Futbol (Soccer).

If Lin changed sports, and became a soccer superstar like Lionel Messi, Maradona, or Beckham, and he played for a team in Spain, Portugal, or Italy ... he could really affect that country's economy in a positive way because they are so invested into their great sport.

 

They could give him the Olympic flame but then mo Williams will slap it out of his hands

 

Lin going would not save Greece.

Europe should make Greece restructure its debt -- swiftly.

It would require delaying interest payments and an orderly reduction of the total debt by 50%. And with 327 billion euros outstanding, we don't recommend this lightly. Usually, Barron's staunchly advocates full repayment to bondholders. But the choice for Greece's bondholders, as we see it, is to accept 50 cents on the euro now -- or 30 cents or worse down the road.

Failure to restructure will also bring further societal and economic ruin. With Greece's unemployment rate at 15%, biding time until an eventual default could throw the country into depression, incite more unrest and drag all of Europe into deep recession. It could even cause Europe's common currency, the euro, to unravel, and shake the foundations of the European Union itself.

Except for a few brave European leaders who have whispered in recent weeks that Greece get debt relief, Europe's official approach has been to muddle along and hope the problem will go away. It won't.

Last week, in its latest Band-Aid attempt, the government announced new austerity measures that will extract a further €6.4 billion ($9.1 billion) from its reeling economy -- through job and wage cuts, and new taxes -- a desperate effort to make up for missed budget targets set in last year's €110 billion bailout by the EU and International Monetary Fund.

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A mass demonstration in central Athens on May 11, as a general strike halted services. Delaying debt-restructuring could lead to more unrest in the streets. AP Photo/ Petros Giannakouris

Not only are steps like that insufficient; they'll bring disastrous economic side effects. The austerity measures already imposed on Greece by its lenders have severely hurt the Greek economy, which shrank by 2.1% in 2009 and 4.5% in 2010, and which will probably contract by a further 3.5% this year. Greece's bondholders are effectively stepping on the country's neck, making the prospect of full debt repayment all the less likely.

Delaying a debt restructuring by even one to two years would mean that the amount to be recovered by bondholders could shrink from 50% to 30%, according to Citigroup. Delay a few more years, and the amount recovered could be next to nothing. Meanwhile, Greece's economy would keep shrinking. That would bring dire human costs, says David Goldman, formerly Bank of America's head of fixed-income research. Unemployment could approach Spain's levels: 20% overall, with youth unemployment near 40%. Emigration would rise, Goldman says. Some public services could be halted, and protests could grow deadly again.

Another bailout won't help. "Greece is bankrupt," says Mark Grant, head of structured finance and corporate syndication at Southwest Securities. "To give Greece more money makes no sense. It just means they get more money they can't pay back."

The better course is to allow Greece to write down its debt now and try to get its economy growing again. Not that a write-down would be painless. With Greece's public debt at €327 billion, a 50% write-down means roughly a €160 billion loss for creditors. Many of them are Greeks themselves, of course. Greek banks would need complete recapitalization, and the rest of the financial system would need huge injections of cash.

The European Central Bank, which is adamantly against a restructuring of any kind, holds an estimated €40 billion to €50 billion of Greek debt, and more in loans -- so the ECB would need more capital to absorb the blow. The money would have to come from wealthier EU members like Germany and France. Such countries have a huge stake in avoiding a European recession, and in keeping the euro intact.

Since the common currency was adopted in 1999, companies in industrially advanced countries like Germany and France have found it far easier to export to European countries that are less competitive, including Greece, Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Italy—the very countries that now find themselves with serious debt problems.

LETTING THE EURO UNRAVEL would be an economic tragedy for Germany and France as well as for Greece, Ireland and Portugal. Short-term, a Greek restructuring could send the euro down sharply.

The market is already anticipating a restructuring of some kind. Depending on their maturity dates, Greek bonds are trading at just 45 cents to 75 cents on the euro.

A 50% write-down of Greek debt would cause losses of tens of billions of dollars at Europe's commercial banks. But most of them could absorb the blow. If a few couldn't, they could either look for new capital, or merge with stronger banks.

It's likely that a Greek restructuring would increase speculation that similar moves would soon follow in other debt-laden European countries, such as Ireland and Portugal. And such write-downs could well happen. But those countries may not need such drastic action, and, even if they do, the write-downs required may not all be as much as 50%. One estimate showed that a 32% write-down of the debt of Greece, Ireland and Portugal would cost Europe's commercial banks €200 billion. That would eliminate a year of the industry's profits before provisions for loan losses, according to Credit Suisse.

By allowing Greece to keep limping along when it needs major surgery, European officials have propped up Continental banks that would have failed. That may seem laudable to some, and it may preserve bank jobs in the short run, but it has caused lingering uncertainty, and hurt long-term economic growth.

Contrast Europe with the U.S., where in the most recent financial crisis, the government allowed a surprising number of major financial players to fail or be bought in fire sales. Among them: Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, Washington Mutual, Wachovia and Countrywide Financial. Result: The U.S. now has a stronger banking system -- and a stronger economy than Europe's.

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It can be argued that the EU would also help its economies by allowing weaker financial players to be winnowed.

In understanding a country's financial health, analysts usually compare its government-debt level with its annual economic output. Economists generally believe that once debt rises above 90% of gross domestic product, a country's resources go mainly to (unproductive) interest payments. What lies ahead could be economic disaster in the form of a constantly shrinking economy and a constantly rising jobless rate.

Greek debt stood at 143% of its annual economic output at the end of last year. But as the nation's economy shrinks, the ratio only gets worse, creating a painful downward spiral. The country has no room for error. If Greece's economy contracts as expected this year, its debt will rise to 160% of GDP next year. Even if Greece executes the bailout plan perfectly, slower-than-projected growth or higher interest rates could push the ratio towards 180% in a few years, say Citigroup and the IMF.

To cope with its crisis, Greece has had to cut spending sharply and raise taxes. Its value-added tax, the main sales tax, is headed for an average 20% increase. As a result of such moves, the budget deficit as a share of GDP dropped to 10.5% last year, from 15% in 2009.

Greece is also looking at €50 billion of privatizations, such as the Hellenic Post Bank (ticker: TT.Greece) and the Hellenic Telecommunications Organization (HLTOY). If it follows through quickly, that would be a big help, but that's a big if.

Short of a restructuring, the only other solution would be a Eurobond, where Greek paper would effectively be swapped for bonds backed by the entire euro zone, akin to the way Brady bonds helped ease the Latin American banking crisis in the U.S. two decades ago. Yet the Germans and other countries, despite their talk of solidarity with Greece, won't back Eurobonds. The political will isn't there.

A wise lender would have to conclude that the Greeks have given just about all they can. The only choice left is restructuring -- and if that doesn't happen soon, a vast array of bondholders will be wiped out.

Sovereign defaults have been dealt with time and again. Bondholders know they're going to take a loss. But by taking steps to relieve some of the debtor's obligations, they can avoid total loss.

That's the kind of help that Greece needs -- right now.

The Greek economy is in a fatal debt trap and crashing. It doesn’t have to be this way for much longer. There are a set of bold steps that Greece could take that would not only set it on the path to stability, but outright prosperity and a genuine and sustained economic boom.

The catch is that it takes visionary, brave and out-the-box leadership, something which is sadly in short supply these days no matter where in the world you find yourself.

Greece is saddled with un-payable debts, inadequate fiat paper currency, a flawed banking system and a huge nanny state. It is also in a demographic death spiral, much like the rest of Europe. But let’s not just focus on the negatives. It also has intelligent, industrious, tough people, a proud history of progress and enlightened thought, stunning real estate, and a natural advantage in things maritime.

Some say Greece is a ticking time bomb. That explosion doesn’t have to be calamitous. It could be an explosion of prosperity, of growth, of progress.

So how does Greece get there? We have already mentioned Greece’s five monsters:

Debt
Fiat currency
The banking system
Large government
Demographics

Greece is only forced to live with the last one for now, and even that one can be turned around eventually. But the first four are rectifiable quickly and with surprisingly less pain than many imagine.

So here is my 7-step plan to fix Greece, in roughly this order.
1. Monetary Legislation – Abolish Legal Tender

The first and most important decision to be made in Greece is for legislators to de-nationalise and de-monopolise currency and declare the geographic area of Greece a laissez faire currency zone with absolutely no capital controls. Any and all types of money from euros to dollars to Turkish lira to seashells can be used in any transaction based on mutual contractual agreement.
2. Liquidation of state assets

The Greek government puts up for auction all state assets, including land. Initial prices are set and a grand auction is held in Athens. Greek nationals are given the right of first refusal in each auction lot. No foreign state or sovereign wealth fund may bid for assets – only private bidders – and contractually no private buyer may ever on-sell to a foreign state or sovereign wealth fund. If no Greek nationals show interest in an asset at the initial ask price, the bidding floor opens up to foreigners. Bids have to be settled in physical gold specie only.
3. Banking Reform

It is estimated that Greece can raise over €300bn worth of gold from an asset sale, plus it has around €5bn of gold reserves, bringing the total gold stock belonging to Greek citizens to over €300bn. Total un-backed bank deposits in commercial banks are around €300bn. Every Euro deposit is immediately converted into the equivalent weight of gold at market prices and the gold is transferred proportionately into the commercial bank vaults. All commercial bank deposit liabilities, denominated in gold, are now fully backed by gold in vaults. Bank run risk (the kind that causes bankruptcy) is eliminated since all fractionally created bank money is immediately eliminated. All outstanding commercial bank loan assets will remain denominated in euros. Banks become holders of deposits in multiple currencies and can facilitate loans in any currency depending on the requirement of the borrower and availability of the currency. Depositors can choose to keep or sell their gold for alternative currencies and remain fully in the banking system. The Greek branch of the ECB is closed down and all ties with the ECB are formally ended. All bank start-up and operating regulations are abolished, save for ordinary juridical requirements of commercial law, including the requirement to hold full reserves. Banking is legally delineated into pure deposit banking and pure loan banking. Banks may not lend out money on deposit, only funds placed with them on loan by yield seeking investors. Greeks can choose for example to shift their gold on deposit into gold or other currency loan accounts to earn yield (but concede to forgo the use of those funds for the term of the loan and accept higher risk).
4. Cessation of state services

Fourth, government declares a 6-month notice period for the complete cessation of all state services and closure of all tax collection offices. All non-wage expenses are to be phased out in 3-months, pension payouts in 6-months. After 6 months all state wage expenses are phased out. The state budget falls to zero, with zero tax receipts. The primary budget is therefore balanced. The executive and the legislature may remain intact but members must fund their own salaries from voluntary donations from their constituencies or from their own personal wealth.
5. 100% Debt Default

Immediately following the announcement to fully end state services and taxes, all Greek sovereign debt obligations are declared an illegitimate burden on future taxpayers and Greece announces without delay a 100% default on all outstanding public debt and interest obligations. Its debt problem is wiped away. Greece now has a fully balanced budget, zero national debt, a privately owned economy, a dynamic monetary system, and a sound, solvent banking system.
6. Private Security

The now abolished police and security services move into private security, paid for by private property owners to protect private property from any potential rioters. State weapons sold in the asset auctions could be used in such defensive efforts. The private security industry booms.
7. Wholesale Deregulation

All price and wage controls are abolished and any state restriction on legitimate private contracts is removed. All trade tariffs, industrial subsidies, and red tape is removed.



Crazy right? No. Necessary. Short of something this radical Greece faces a grim future.

Capital would soon begin flooding into Greece. Chronic malinvestments would liquidate rapidly. Greek citizens would be forced to sell their labour at a market rate to a willing employer in the private sector. Requiring physical gold as payment for the asset sales would likely raise the global price of gold in nominal and real terms, adding to the wealth transfer to Greek citizens. National debt obligations no longer drain the life of the Greek economy.

Private property rights, flexible labour markets, no taxes, and the completely free movement of capital with no business regulation, save for ordinary traditional commercial law, would see boom times rapidly return to Greece. This time it would be a sustainable boom. Since all land would be owned privately, private property owners would set ‘immigration policy’ individually. Private defence and security services would aid private property owners in protecting their land from unwanted guests.

Greeks would be unable to rely on the nanny state any longer. Instead they would need to form stronger community bonds again with vibrant, localised commerce flourishing. The value of family and long term planning would rise. The wealthy and large Greek diaspora as well as wealthy local Greeks (and anyone else for that matter) could set up private, well-administered funds to help pensioners with little or no support. Natural local authority would replace unnatural centralised state authority. Marriage rates would likely increase and the value of offspring would be more greatly appreciated as time preferences begin to fall and saving rates rise. Greece’s fifth monster, demographic decay, would soon be thwarted as fecundity improves.

Radical problems require radical solutions.

 

You may think that. But Jeremy Lin could save Greece.

A visit to Greece leaves many vivid impressions. There are, of course, the country's rich history, abundance of archeological sites, azure skies, and crystalline seas. But there is also the intense pressure under which Greek society is now functioning – and the extraordinary courage with which ordinary citizens are coping with economic disaster. Lin would be the beacon to inspire that courage.

The critical policy mistakes were those committed at the outset of the crisis. It was already clear in the first half of 2010, when Greece lost access to financial markets, that the public debt was unsustainable. The country's sovereign debt should have been restructured without delay.

Had Greece quickly written down its debt burden by two-thirds, it would have been able to shed its crushing debt overhang. It could have used a portion of the interest savings to recapitalise the banks. It could have cut taxes, rather than raising them. It could have jump-started investment and got its economy moving again, if not in a matter of months, then, with luck, in no more than a year.

In its official post-mortem on the crisis, the International Monetary Fund now agrees that debt restructuring should have been undertaken earlier. But this was not its view at the time. Under the leadership of Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the Fund was in thrall to the French and German governments, which adamantly opposed debt relief.

The European Commission, for its part, has rejected the IMF's mea culpa. Preoccupied by the state of the French and German banks, it continues to argue that delaying debt restructuring was the right thing to do. It has no regrets about throwing Greece to the wolves.

Given this opposition, the Greek government would have had to move unilaterally. Hindsight suggests that the authorities should have done just that. Faced with foreign opposition, the government should have announced its decision to restructure as a fait accompli.

Clearly, there would have been risks. The "troika" – the IMF, the European Commission, and the European Central Bank – might have refused to provide an aid package, forcing Greece to compress imports even more sharply. The ECB might have cut off emergency liquidity assistance, forcing the government to impose capital controls and even consider abandoning the euro.

But, by acting preemptively, Greek leaders could have shaped the dialogue. They could have said to their EU colleagues, "Look, we have no choice but to restructure what is clearly an unsustainable debt. But make no mistake: our preference is to remain in the eurozone. We are committed to reforms. Given this, don't you agree that we are deserving of your support?"

Making a compelling case would have required Greece to get serious about those reforms. The government could have started by bringing together employers and unions to negotiate an equitable burden-sharing agreement, including an across-the-board reduction in wages and pensions, thereby getting a jump on internal devaluation. This could then have been complemented by a simultaneous agreement to restructure private debts. With everyone accepting sacrifices, it might have been possible to reach an accord on liberalising closed professions and on comprehensive tax reform.

But, instead of working together with its social partners, the government, heeding the troika's advice, dismantled the country's collective-bargaining system, leaving workers unrepresented. Greece thus lacked a mechanism to negotiate a social compact to cut wages, pensions, and other obligations in an equitable way. With every vested interest fighting for itself, closed professions proved impossible to pry open. Doubting that there would be shared sacrifice, those same interest groups were unable to negotiate meaningful tax reform.

With the Greek government thus failing to push through structural reforms, it was unable to earn the trust of its creditors; and, skeptical that the government was committed to reform, the troika demanded a pound of flesh, in the form of front-loaded austerity, as the price of assistance. Those front-loaded tax increases and government-spending cuts plunged the economy deeper into recession, making a farce of claims that the public debt was sustainable – and forcing the inevitable debt restructuring after two more agonizing years.

Greece is now seeking to make the best of a difficult situation. It is attempting to breathe life into the campaign for structural reform. It is lobbying the troika for further debt relief. But the damage will not be easily undone. Past mistakes, committed not just by Greece, but also by its international partners, make a difficult short-term future unavoidable.

It is important that other countries draw the right lessons. If they do, Greece's brave, beleaguered citizens can at least take comfort in knowing that many people elsewhere will be spared the same unnecessary sacrifices.

 

Vassilis Spanoulis, is that you?

 

What would the Greeks throw at Lin? That country is racist as ****.

 

Absolutely. The United States of America is the Number 1 destination for Chinese tourists, at least in terms of the amount of money they spend. Greece would immediately become one of the top vacation spots for Chinese tourists if Jeremy went there to play. The rest is just gravy. The Parthenon! The salads! I love the country, but I'm concerned that the prices would skyrocket. Don't do it, Jeremy!

 

If Greece is good enough for Jacki Onassis, it's good enough for Lin!

 

I guess it depends. Do they need to turnover their economy? Lin is great at turnovers.

 

Are there no Chinese players in any of the Euro leagues?

 

Republic of Taiwan. I demand rep!

 

Chinese don't give a flick until their people reach the top... if Lin plays in Europe, all Chinese would abandon him and say he is a shame who got flunk out of NBA.

Hence, Lin won't be able to save Greece.

 

V-Span versus Lin would be the biggest rumble since Godzilla versus King Kong. (Vassilis is King Kong, just based on hairiness.)

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